This is an empirical and quantitative study of the validity of four kinds of distal explanatory factors in risk perception. In an initial study, personality constructs (Five Factor Model, Myers-Briggs Indicator of Jungian constructs and risk attitudes) were related to risk perception data (26 hazards). A relationship was found between emotional stability and risk perception, but none with Jungian constructs. One risk attitude dimension, 'Macho' risk willingness, was (negatively) related to demand for governmental risk mitigation. In a second study with a different sample, indices were constructed to measure the four World Views according to Cultural Theory (CT) as well as Group/Grid dimensions, New Age beliefs and the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) dimensions of Dunlap et al. Risk perception data were obtained with regard to 37 hazards, both general and personal risk. The respondents were a large representative sample of the Swedish population. Only about 5% of the variance of perceived risk was accounted for by Cultural Theory dimensions, considerably more by New Age beliefs and one of the NEP scales (eco-crisis). In a third study, data from the five Nordic countries were used to analyse the relationships between CT dimensions and risk perception. Only weak relations were found. The results are discussed in relation to other current work on models of risk perception and the question of what should be considered 'strong' evidence for a theory.
Introduction
Risk perception is focused in many current social science investigations and applications (Sjöberg, 1999b; Sjöberg, 2001b) . The need for understanding what factors are important in accounting for risk perception is obvious (Sjöberg, 2000b) . The best known attempt to model risk perception is the Psychometric Model (Fischhoff et al., 1978) ; see Sjöberg (2002a) for a discussion. The Psychometric Model attempts to track risk perception to characteristics of hazards, such as voluntariness and new versus old risk.
The Psychometric Model is an example of an approach that uses explanatory variables which are semantically close to the risk dimensions which it tries to explain. The model uses aspects or characteristics of the hazards to account for its perceived level or risk, and for risk acceptability. It is a general and powerful principle that variables which are close in semantic content tend to correlate more than those which are distant in content (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Sjöberg, 1980) . Obtaining high correlations between semantically distant measures is more difficult than between those which are semantically close, but often also more interesting (Slovic and Peters, 1998) . (Lester and Bombaci, 1984) . A Swedish scale, using an ipsative (comparative judgements) format, was developed by the author.
The risk attitude scale measures:
• Anti-authoritarian inclination These risk attitudes were originally suggested in the literature on civil aviation accidents, where they have been suggested to account for a large share of pilot error, in so far as accidents are due to some form of pilot risk taking. They appear, however, to be much more generally applicable and comparisons of various groups have given promising results (so far unpublished). The present values of Cronbach's alpha were, in the order of the scales given above, 0.52, 0.63, 0.65, 0.61, 0.53 and 0.65 . These values are low, but so were the standard deviations of the scores. In a nonselect group of adults, alphas around 0.75 were recently obtained. In the nonselect group, the standard deviations were about 30% larger than in the present group. The current emphasis in personality psychology on the 'Big Five' personality factors (the Five Factor Model) opens the door for some new developments with regard to personality, job performance (Goldberg, 1994; Wiggins and Trapnell, 1997) and social skills (Shafer, 1999) . In the present study, use was made of a Big Five questionnaire constructed by Hendruks (1997) and translated and adapted to Swedish use by Ekehammar.
METHOD
Subjects were instructed to rate 26 hazards in terms of personal risk, general risk, demand for risk mitigation by the government, and personal responsibility for risk mitigation for each hazard, see Table 1 . Category scales going from 0 to 7 were used throughout, using 8 discrete steps. (A few more risk ratings were also obtained but they will not be reported here.) A Big Five questionnaire was also used, having 20 balanced items in each factor. 2 The alpha values were 0.8 or better. The Myers-Briggs test was administered in standard format. The Swedish version of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Mårdberg et al., 1994) was used, but the typology was not employed, only its informational basis of 4 dimensions.
The risk attitude scale used an ipsative format. Subjects were instructed to rank how well they agreed with the statements in lists of six statements each. Ten such lists were presented, in all 60 items, and each scale score was thus based on 10 items. 3 The respondents were also asked to agree or disagree with each item, and the final rank score of each item was negative if the subject disagreed, positive if he or she agreed to it. On the whole, the subjects appeared to be highly motivated for the test. The relationships between risk perception and demand for risk mitigation and the Jungian dimensions were throughout negligible. An example is given in Table 1 which gives the results for personal risk correlated with each of the four Jungian dimensions. Very similar results were obtained for general risk and demand for risk mitigation. Only a few (weak) correlations were significant, seemingly at random.
The Big Five factors did somewhat better. The pattern of Table 2 (personal risk) tells the story. The factor of emotional stability had a weak but consistent tendency to be related to perceived risk, both personal and general. However, there was no relationship between the Big Five and demand for risk mitigation.
Finally, risk attitudes were also related to risk perception data, and results were interesting in particular for governmental responsibility to mitigate risk, see Table 3. The   1111  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  20111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7111  81111 190 Sjöberg Tables 1-3 were not appreciably changed when measures of social desirability response style were partialled out. The measures used were those suggested by Crowne and Marlowe (1960) and the MPI Lie scale (Eysenck, 1959) .
DISCUSSION
The present results show:
• Jungian dimensions as measured by the Myers-Briggs scale are probably not useful for understanding risk perception
•
Of the Big Five scales, only emotional stability was (negatively) related to perceived risk, both general and personal, but not to demand for risk mitigation 1111  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  20111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40111  1  2  3  4  5  6  71  81111 Distal factors in risk perception 191 Previous studies have reported results that are in accordance with the present findings regarding the relationship between perceived risk and emotional stability (Sjöberg, 1998b; Källmén, 2000) . The fact that perceived risk has structural properties different from demand for risk mitigation is to be expected from work on demand for risk reduction, which has shown that such demand is only weakly related to size of a perceived risk, much more to the severity of consequences should an adverse event occur (Sjöberg, 1999a; Sjöberg, 2000a) .
Personality theories such as the Jungian one lend themselves easily to speculations about risk perception. However, what data say is another thing. Risk perception is not easy to account for with personality concepts and the present results, while consistent, do not show very strong correlations. Maybe other personality constructs will do better. But it is likely that it will be hard to find them. Standard Big Five scales used here do cover a wide ground of personality in a succinct manner.
It is interesting to note that demand for risk mitigation could be explained to some extent with a risk attitude. The demand variable has turned out to be quite hard to account for in previous research. It is possible that it would be fruitful in future work to further develop the attitude measure, in order to account for at least part of the demand dimensions.
Study 2
In the present study, three distal approaches to risk perception are studied and compared: Cultural Theory (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) , the NEP scales (Dunlap et al., 1992) and New Age beliefs (Sjöberg, 2002c) . In Cultural Theory it is assumed that people 'choose' to worry about different hazards on the basis of their social engagements in a 'Group/Grid' pattern. The theory is presented in a text by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) , see Boholm for a cogent critique (Boholm, 1996) . Most of the empirical work on this model is quantitative and uses scales devised by Dake (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990) , or similar to them. In the USA, such scales account typically for some 10% of the explained variance of perceived risk; but in Europe only for about 5% (Sjöberg, 1997; Brenot et al., 1998; Sjöberg, 1998a) . In spite of the weak empirical results of Cultural Theory it seems to be credible in some quarters, see e.g. Adams (1995) , and it is used in various applied settings. Further empirical work on the theory is therefore called for. A recent discussion by Tansey (in press), in particular, called for further work on these issues, since it also brought up the issue of distal explanatory variables more generally.
Statistical illusions seem to occur in discussions of Cultural Theory. Peters and Slovic obtained data well in line with a very modest explanatory power (Peters and Slovic, 1996) but described their very low correlations, down to values well below 0.05, between Cultural Theory scales and risk perception as 'strong'.
Almost all of the attempts at quantitative tests of Cultural Theory investigate the link between World Views and risk perception. However, the most basic concepts in the theory are those of Group and Grid and they have rarely been tested. 'Grid' refers to deference to others, especially to authority. 'Group' refers to membership in groups and freedom of expression of deviant opinions. Here the relationship between risk perception and World Views is investigated once more, now with a large and reasonably representative sample of the Swedish population. Also the Group/Grid dimensions are investigated and related to risk perception. Furthermore, New Age beliefs are investigated. In a previous study by Sjöberg (2002c) it was found that such beliefs correlated moderately strongly (about 15% explained variance) with perceived level of various technology and environment hazards. Such a relationship was expected on the grounds that the New Age movement, very strong and of growing importance since the 1970s, at its core includes a set of beliefs which are alien and even hostile to modern technology and to science.
It is therefore interesting to compare and contrast World Views according to Cultural Theory and New Age beliefs. The former are based on an elaborate theory about social processes which are assumed to generate belief structures. The belief contents are quite distant from risks and hazards (with a few exceptions in some of the scales which have been used to measure them). For example, egalitarian beliefs are close to political socialism, and individualistic beliefs are close to classical liberalism. New Age beliefs, on the other hand, tend to be oriented towards various conceptions of epistemology and ontology. In the previous work cited above, Sjöberg found, using a large number of items as potential indicators of New Age beliefs, four distinct factors: The most powerful dimension turned out to be the first one, illustrated by the items used (see Appendix). In addition, beliefs in paranormal phenomena such as the Bermuda Triangle and 'The hundredth ape' were useful as an explanatory factor in accounting for perceived risk.
A final set of items was concerned with environmental beliefs (Dunlap and van Liere, 1978; Dunlap et al., 1992; Dietz et al., 1998; Dunlap et al., 2000) , and measured five such dimensions:
1. Limits to growth 2. Anti-anthropocentrism 3. Balance of nature 4. Rejection of exemptionalism 5. Possibility of eco-crisis Some environmental beliefs have been found to correlate moderately strongly with risk perception (Sjöberg, 2002b) . The NEP items have been used in many contexts to measure environmental concern and were therefore considered to be of interest here. The purpose of the study was, thus, to investigate three sets of potentially important distal determinants of risk perception.
Most previous work has been carried out with convenience samples or with samples with very low response rates, see the methodological discussion in Sjöberg and DrottzSjöberg (2001) ; In the present paper results on these dimensions from a large representative sample of the Swedish population are presented.
METHOD
A questionnaire was mailed to a random sample of the Swedish population. It was intended to cover a wide range of issues and the respondents therefore were asked to answer 313 questions on a total of 37 pages. The questionnaire was sent out in May 1998. The net sample consisted of 1202 respondents. Since we got 797 answers, the response rate was 66.3%. The sample was bought from SPAR (the government's person and address database) and included respondents in the age range 18-75, but three people had turned 76 when they responded to the questionnaire. The respondents who were not Swedish citizens were excluded from the sample as well as the respondents stating that they were not the person to whom the questionnaire was addressed.
The objective of the study was to work with a sample that was representative of the Swedish population, in order to be able to generalize the results. According to the results regarding background variables, we seem to have reached that objective. The sample is representative of the Swedish population in terms of gender distribution and average age. When it comes to whether the respondents had children or not, it turned out that the percentage of respondents who had children was slightly higher than the percentage among the Swedish population. Since the difference was so small, it is reasonable to conclude that it did not affect the results very much. With regard to income, there was a 1111  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  20111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7111  81111 difference between the sample and the Swedish population. Income is not, however, an important explanatory variable. Furthermore, the structure of employment status among the respondents was quite similar to that of the population, but there were differences consisting of fewer students and more retired people in the sample. This is a well-known phenomenon, which is probably due to the fact that retired people have more time to fill out extensive questionnaires. Moreover, there was a notable difference between the share of unemployed people in the sample and the share in the population, which is probably at least partly a consequence of the fact that the unemployment rates had decreased somewhat in Sweden since 1997 (the year from which the information on unemployment rates was collected). The respondents are also representative of the population in terms of type of employer and occupational status. The largest difference is due to educational level. The respondents were better educated than the general population. Level of education tends, however, to be only weakly related to risk perception. Hence, the main conclusion is that the sample on the whole is representative of the population, especially with a response rate as high as 66.3%.
In the present study ratings of general and personal risk of 37 hazards are used (see Table 7 ), on eight step category scales. A 'don't know' response category was also used, and DK answers were throughout treated as missing. In addition to the risk ratings, we also used new items measuring World Views and Group/Grid dimensions (Lockart et al., 1997) . It had been believed in some quarters that the lacklustre effects in many studies were due to items being too similar to the American ones and not taking special cultural dimensions into account. Hence, it was of interest to scrutinize the validity of Cultural Theory with items that may fit better in a European context.
RESULTS

Cultural Theory
Indices were formed, to measure the six core concepts of Cultural Theory, viz. hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, fatalism, group and grid. There were three items for each of these indices. The first task was to study correlations between World Views and perceived general and personal risk of the 37 hazards, see Tables 4 and 5 .
It is immediately clear from the tables that neither general nor personal risk ratings were strongly correlated with world views. Egalitarianism and fatalism did show some tendency towards correlations about 0.2. Naturally, many correlations were significant, due to the large sample size.
Cultural theory makes differential predictions about the relationships between different hazards and the World Views. However, multiple regression analyses with all World Views and the Group/Grid dimensions as explanatory variables yield an upper bound to how much can be accounted for. The average R 2 adj was 2.6% for personal risk and 3.2% for general risk.
According to Cultural Theory, the four combinations of high versus low group and grid should be characterized as follows:
• High group, high grid: hierarchy 
Correlations between the four World View scales were very low and nonsignificant for the group variable. For grid, they were all significant at the 0.01 level or better: 0.43, 0.11, 0.26 and 0.11, respectively. The sample was split at the median of group and grid, respectively, and these variables were used as independent variables in two-way ANOVA's with the four World View scales as dependent variables. Grid was significant throughout, group not in any case. No interactions were significant. High grid-low group gave the 
Comparing New Age, Environmental Beliefs and World Views
Six indices of risk perception were formed, measuring personal and general risk of hazards in general, radiation hazards (non-nuclear) and nuclear hazards. The grouping of hazards was based on both practical and theoretical considerations, since people were expected to react in special ways to radiation and nuclear hazards. The indices were subjected to block regression analyses, with the following strategy:
• Block 1 -age, sex, educational level and political orientation (left versus right)
• Block 2 -New Age Beliefs The amount of total variance explained by each block, as well as the added variance due the inclusion of each block, are given in Table 8 . It is seen that World Views constituted the least efficient block of predictors, accounting for a mere 5.5% of the variance in perceived risk, on the average. NEP scales were also not more efficient than that. New Age beliefs accounted for twice that amount. World Views only contributed another 2.6% explained variance in addition to the other blocks, on the average. Furthermore, the regression coefficients (see Table 9 for personal nuclear risk) showed that New Age beliefs had a dominating position in accounting for perceived risk, when all independent variables were included in the regression equation. It was even more powerful than gender. New Age beliefs had the largest regression weight in four of the six analyses and a large one also in the remaining two.
Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 allow for the analysis of several approaches to distal determinants of perceived risk. However, the most important one has been Cultural Theory and it is therefore justified to obtain more extensive data than in previous studies on its dimensions and relation to perceived risk. In a collaborative project, the four CT dimensions were measured in the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and related to risk perception of genetic engineering (Grendstad et al., 1999) .
METHOD
The technical details of this study are available in a separate publication (Grendstad et al., 1999) . The data were obtained by professional polling firms and with telephone interviews. The respondents are representative of the respective populations, aged 15 and above, in the sense of professional standards developed by these firms. The sample sizes obtained were Denmark: 1015 , Finland: 1003 1000. There were five items for each of the four CT dimensions. Great care was taken in translating the items to make them comparable in content and connotations across countries. There were also two items measuring the perceived personal and general risk of genetic engineering.
RESULTS
The Cronbach ␣ values are given in Table 10 , correlations with risk perception in Tables  11 and 12 . The data show acceptable reliabilities, although in some cases bordering on low values. This is a fairly common finding in CT work with few items. The correlations with risk perception within countries were low but in many cases statistically significant. There were some consistent trends in the sense that signs and levels of correlation coefficients were similar across the five countries. The data set allows for a detailed analysis of the relationships. Personal risk was selected for the analysis, as well as egalitarianism. The overall correlation was 0.13 (p < 0.0005). The sample was divided into 10 deciles with regard to egalitarianism and the mean standardized risk was computed for each decile, see Fig. 1 of risk ratings for the 20 per cent lowest and the 20 per cent highest in egalitarianism are given in Fig. 2 . The figures show that the strongest relationship between perceived risk and the CT dimension are found for low values of egalitarianism (Fig. 1) . Furthermore, there is a group of low egalitarians who also are extremely low in perceived risk. It is this group which accounts for the relationship. A further analysis of the low-risk and high-risk judges was of interest. The subgroup rating both personal and general risk as = 1 ('insignificant') was singled out (N = 636), and standardized values of the CT dimensions computed and compared to all other respondents (N = 3632), see Fig. 3 . In the same figure, data are also provided for the subgroup rating both risks as 'very large', a group consisting of 125 (3%) risk alerters.
The high-risk raters may be termed risk alerters and the low-risk raters risk deniers. The risk deniers turned out to be especially low in egalitarianism but also in fatalism and high in individualism. The hierarchy dimension did not differentiate them from all others. The risk alerters were high especially in egalitarianism but also to some extent in hierarchy and low in individualism. The low-risk group contained 64.2% of men, for all others the figure was 47.0%. The risk alerters had a slight majority of women, 56%. If risk deniers and risk alerters are deleted, all correlations between perceived risk and CT dimensions fell below 0.1, except for general risk and egalitarianism and fatalism which correlated 0.13 and 0.12 in the group that remained. Note that even a low correlation of 0.13 looks like a strong relationship in this kind of plot.
DISCUSSION
The significant values in the present study were found with large sample sizes. Hence, values down to 0.07 were significant at the 0.05 level. The absolute size of the correlations were, however, quite modest and in line with other empirical tests of CT. Egalitarianism seemed to be most clearly related to perceived risk. The findings support the notion that there exists a weak but consistent relationship between perceived risk and at least some CT dimensions. A further analysis suggested that the crucial distinction is that between low-risk judges and others. The low-risk judges did have a deviating CT profile with a quite low value in egalitarianism and a relatively low value in fatalism and high in individualism. They tended to be men. This is a pattern remindful of the Flynn and Slovic findings that low risk ratings were given by white men, while women and black men gave higher ratings (Flynn et al., 1994) . In a recent study we also found some evidence of a tendency to mock the risk of genetic engineering, even seeing it as morally condemnable not to support it (Sjöberg, 2002b) . It may be concluded that correlations between CT dimensions and perceived risk are largely due to the existence of a group of risk deniers (in the present data 15% of all respondents), but also a group of risk alerters (much smaller) plays a role in boosting the relationship. 
General discussion
The present results agree well with the previous study of risk perception and New Age beliefs (Sjöberg, 2002c) . Since the New Age movement has developed and grown in parallel with technology opposition and worries about technology risks, and since the movement espouses many beliefs alien or even hostile to science and technology, it seems reasonable to conclude that it may be an important component in modern risk discourse. The problem of finding distal determinants of risk perception is of course not solved by the use of New Age beliefs. Much remains to be explained. It is, however, possible that New Age beliefs constitute a promising start towards the understanding of risk perception on the basis of a variable that does not have a close conceptual relationship to perceived risk.
The present findings may seem to be hard to reconcile with Cultural Theory. However, some authors argue that a pattern of correlations in accordance with a theory is the important type of finding and that strength of relationship is an inconsequential aspect ; see Sjöberg (2002a) for a discussion. However, weak correlations can easily arise due to the effect of confounding factors, such as demographic dimensions. In addition -and more important -a theory whose proponents are satisfied with explaining only a very small share of the phenomenon it sets out to account for is of marginal interest. After all, we should explain as much as possible of the true variance of risk perception.
Other types of value dimensions do not fare very well either. In other work, the World Views suggested by Buss and Craik (1983) have been found to be equally, in fact even more, ineffective than Cultural Theory variables in accounting for risk perception (Sjöberg, 2002b) , and the same can be said for more general value dimension systems (Sjöberg, 1998a) . Hence, Cultural Theory does not come out very well in the present study, neither do World Views nor the Group/Grid dimensions. In this sense, the present results are in good agreement with previous research, with the possible exception of Dake's dissertation (Dake, 1990; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990) where stronger correlations were reported. It is unclear what the reason could have been for the more positive results obtained by Dake. Now, given the very weak findings, what -if anything -can save the theory? One strategy is to do qualitative case studies (Tansey and O'Riordan, 1999) . One can always hope to find single individuals who appear to function according to the theory. This is true in clinical psychology as well, to take another example, and little of interest seems to be coming out of such an approach. In medical research, a similar warning against reliance on single case studies was issued in a paper by Kline (Kline, 1962) , who called this strategy 'individualizing' and grouped it with other methods for dodging from negative conclusions on the basis of empirical evidence. It is just too easy to bend and twist the 'evidence' to fit to the desires of the investigator, who often has a vested interest in demonstrating the truth of his theory.
Another strategy is simply to deny that the theory was intended to explain risk perception in the first place. Given published articles with this very purpose, it is a surprising claim, but nonetheless Marris et al. (1998) write that 'cultural theory does not really claim to explain such abstract ratings of risk ' (p. 645) .
Still another way out is to state that better measures of cultural biases would yield stronger results (Peters and Slovic, 1996) . Yes, provided that the theory holds . The logic   1111  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  20111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30111  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40111  1  2  3  4  5  6  71  81111 statistical twisting and bending of the data, however sophisticated, will save the model as long as powerful explanatory variables simply have not been measured. The same argument can be made for Cultural Theory.
Conclusion
The studies reported here have shown that it is hard to devise distal explanations of risk perception, but also that some variables show promise. The finding that emotional stability has some relationship to risk perception is in accordance with some other work by Källmén and Sjöberg. 'Macho' risk taking propensity is a promising factor for understanding demand for risk mitigation. The latter dimension has usually turned out to be quite hard to account for (Sjöberg, 1999a) .
The present findings also give clear support to the stability of New Age attitudes in accounting for perceived risk. The New Age movement is contemporary with technology opposition, it involves ontological and epistemological concerns leading to anti-science and anti-technology standpoints, and is hence a very reasonable distal dimension in accounting for the perceived risk of technology.
All explanations call for further explanations. If New Age in part is responsible for perceived risk and technology opposition, what caused New Age? This interesting sociological question is discussed elsewhere (Sjöberg, 2002c) .
